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 Zusammenfassung 
Das vorliegende Papier zeigt, dass sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung, kulturelle 
Modernisierung und demokratische Regimeperformanz ein kohärentes Syndrom sozialen 
Wandels bilden – ein Syndrom, dessen integrierender Kern von der klassischen 
Modernisierungstheorie nicht hinreichend spezifiziert wurde. Wir spezifizieren diesen 
Kern mit dem Konzept der Humanentwicklung. Wir argumentieren, dass die drei 
Komponenten der Humanentwicklung dahingehend zusammenwirken, dass sie die 
individuelle Optionsvielfalt steigern. Sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung erweitert Optionen, 
indem sie den Individuen mehr Ressourcen verleiht; kulturelle Modernisierung mobilisiert 
Ansprüche, die die Individuen nach Optionsvielfalt streben lassen; und Demokratie sichert 
Optionen durch rechtliche Garantien. Eine Analyse der Weltwertestudien zeigt, dass es (1) 
einen universellen Nexus aus Ressourcen, Ansprüchen und Garantien gibt, der sich auf der 
individuellen, nationalen und supra-nationalen Ebene über 80 Gesellschaften und 8 
Kulturzonen nachweisen lässt; (2) dass die endogene Genese dieses Syndroms der 
Humanentwicklung durch kausale Effekte von Ressourcen und Ansprüchen auf Garantien 
zustande kommt; und (3) dass regelkonformes Elitenverhalten eine exogene Determinante 
dieses Syndroms insgesamt ist. 
Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that socioeconomic development, cultural modernization, and 
democratic regime performance constitute a coherent syndrome of social change—a syn-
drome whose common focus has not properly been specified by standard modernization 
theory. We specify this syndrome as Human Development, arguing that its three compo-
nents have a common focus on individual choice. Socioeconomic development broadens 
individual choice by giving people more resources; cultural modernization gives rise to 
aspirations that lead people to seek for individual choice; and democracy extends individ-
ual choice by codifying legal opportunities. Analysis of data from 80 societies demon-
strates: (1) that a universal resource-aspiration-opportunity syndrome is present at the 
individual, national and supra-national levels across 80 nations and 8 cultural zones; (2) 
that this Human Development syndrome is endogenously shaped by a causal effect from 
resources and aspirations on opportunities; and (3) that elite integrity or “good governance” 
is a strong exogenous determinant of the Human Development syndrome as a whole. 

 Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann 
Human Development as a General Theory of Social Change: A Multi-
Level and Cross-Cultural Perspective 
Introduction 
Students of social change have focused on three major processes. The most fundamental 
one, socioeconomic development, has been described innumerable times (among many oth-
ers see Lewis 1955; Rustow 1963; Bell 1973; Chirot 1986; Perkin 1996; Rowen 1996; 
Estes 1998; Hughes 1999). Most scholars agree that socioeconomic development reflects a 
set of closely linked changes including productivity growth, improving quality of life in 
terms of health and life expectancy, increasing material prosperity, expanding education 
and communication, and increasing social diversification. 
The second process, cultural modernization, is assumed to co-evolve with socioeco-
nomic development when rationalized market relations and expanding horizontal networks 
disburden people from hierarchical and parochial clientelistic ties that restrict human 
autonomy (Weber 1958; Banfield 1958; Eckstein 1988; Coleman 1988). Cultural moderni-
zation, if it occurs, reshapes a society’s prevailing attitudes in ways that have been 
described in various terms, such as the emergence of “democratic personalities” (Lasswell 
1958; Sniderman 1975), “civic cultural attitudes” (Almond and Verba 1963), “individual 
modernity” (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Inkeles 1983), “postmaterialist values” (Inglehart 
1977, 1990), “liberal attitudes” (Brint 1984; Nevitte 1996), or “social capital” (Coleman 
1988; Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). Cultural modernization is present to the degree that 
traditional-deferential orientations, which subordinate the individual to the community, 
give way to more ambitious aspirations which emphasize the value of the individual and 
which include increasing self-respect, more self-determined forms of civic engagement, 
less personalized and more generalized forms of social trust as well as growing tolerance of 
human diversity (cf. Eckstein 1988; Nevitte 1996; Inglehart 1997). 
The third major process occurs in a society’s political institutions. The most notable 
development in this field has been a profound tendency to improving the democratic per-
formance of political regimes during the past three decades. This happened in two ways. 
Most obviously, numerous authoritarian regimes have adopted representative democratic 
institutions through the “Third Wave of Democratization” (Huntington 1991; Sørensen 
1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; Kurzman 1998; Nagle and Mahr 1999; Dorenspleet 2000). 
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On the other hand, there seems to be a more subliminal trend in established representative 
democracies. Since the late 1970s, most of them have implemented or extended direct 
democratic institutions (Cronin 1998; Scarrow 1999) and they have experienced more 
direct democratic forms of civic participation (Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979; Budge 1996; 
Dalton 1996). Some scholars interpret these changes as an acceleration of a more enduring 
historical trend towards the “growth of democracy” (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1990; 
Diamond 1993; Modelski and Perry 1993; Jaggers and Gurr 1995). 
As often as the processes of socioeconomic development, cultural modernization and 
democratization have been described (for a recent affirmation see Pye 1990 and Diamond 
1992), they have been suspected and even refuted (see Randall and Theobald 1998 for a 
discussion of revisionism and modernization). It has been debated, for instance, whether 
these processes manifest irreversible linear trends or follow cyclical patterns with major 
setbacks; whether they are uniformly global or culture-specific in a way that prescribes an 
inherently Western model; and even whether they are desirable or not. 
One point, however, can hardly be denied: if socioeconomic development, cultural mod-
ernization and democratization occur, they tend to do so on coincidently low or high levels. 
Societies that are economically less advanced, most obviously those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
tend to be dominated by traditional belief systems and usually have political regimes whose 
democratic performance is poor. Most of the OECD-countries, by contrast, are economi-
cally advanced and characterized by modern mass cultures. Usually their regimes show a 
strong democratic performance (see Inglehart and Baker 2000 for statistical evidence of 
this global pattern). On a smaller scale, the same pattern characterizes the postcommunist 
world: economically more advanced countries, like the Czech Republic, Hungary, or 
Poland, show more modernized cultures and have better consolidated democracies than 
economically less advanced ones, such as Romania, Belarus, or Ukraine (see Rose 2001). 
In any case, there seems to be a strong coincidence between nations’ socioeconomic devel-
opment, cultural modernity and democratic performance. 
This insight is not new. In fact, it is conventional wisdom of classical modernization 
theory (see Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Coleman 1968; Pye 1990; Diamond 1992). What is 
new, is the empirical evidence that has been added in recent years: thanks to the World 
Values Surveys this applies in particular to the role of cultural modernization (Inglehart 
1990, 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000). Yet, we lack an integrated theory of social change. 
Modernization theorists have argued for close relations between socioeconomic develop-
ment, cultural modernization and democratic performance, but they did not properly spec-
ify the common focus of these three phenomena. Either they used modernization as an 
umbrella term which has been defined by enumerating its concrete components but not by 
what integrates them (Lerner 1968: 385); or they restricted modernization to the socioeco-
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nomic field which let them view democracy as a consequence rather than an integral part of 
modernization (Huntington 1991: 69); or they specified modernization in formalistic terms, 
such as “functional differentiation” (Mouzelis 1999), which provides no evident criteria to 
distinguish what is and what is not an element of modernization. Hence, there is no general 
definition of modernization that clarifies in which common principle its various compo-
nents converge. 
Empirical studies reflect this lack of theoretical integration. Most of them focus on only 
one of the three relationships within the syndrome of socioeconomic development, cultural 
modernization and democratic regime performance. These studies pay little or no attention 
to the fact that they capture only one facet of a more comprehensive syndrome. Thus, 
existing explanations of this syndrome’s internal linkages are disintegrated. They do not 
refer to a common principle and are therefore only loosely related to each other. Arguments 
about causal effects are based on isolated bivariate logics. Even the few studies that deal 
with all three processes dissolve the whole complex into single pairs of relations, each of 
which is discussed in separation (cf. Muller and Seligson 1994; Inglehart 1997; Sides 1999; 
Inglehart and Baker 2000). As a consequence, the debate is fragmented and puzzling. 
Indeed, the literature entails six contradicting hypotheses, one for each causal relationship 
that is logically possible. 
Following Lipset (1959), numerous authors claimed that socioeconomic development 
leads political regimes to improve or sustain their democratic performance (among others 
Cutright 1963; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Burkhart and 
Lewis-Beck 1994; Barro 1997; Vanhanen 1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998), while oth-
ers argue that “effective democracy” promotes political stability, provides better economic 
policies and thus improves life quality and as a consequence also socioeconomic develop-
ment (Ersson and Lane 1996; Rowen 1996; Leblang 1997; Yi Feng 1997; Frey and Al-
Roumi 1999; Olson, Sarna, and Swamy 2000). Some observers postulate that socioeco-
nomic development leads to cultural modernization (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Inkeles 1983; 
Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000), but others hypothesize that cultural modernity 
accelerates socioeconomic development (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Landes 1998). And while some analysts suggest that “effective democracy” 
favors the emergence of modern pro-democratic cultures (Rustow 1970; Muller and 
Seligson 1994; Jackman and Miller 1998), others argue the opposite flow of causation: 
cultural modernization puts political regimes under popular pressure to improve or sustain 
their democratic performance (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997). 
To summarize these contradictions we cite Dahl (1997: 35) who notes that “the exact 
nature of the relationship among socioeconomic modernization [‘development’ in our 
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words], democratization, and the creation of a democratic culture [or ‘modern culture’] is 
almost as puzzling today as it was a quarter-century ago.” 
The source of this puzzle is that no one, as far as we know, starts with the fundamental 
question: what is the common denominator in which socioeconomic development, cultural 
modernization, and democracy converge? This question is posed vigorously by the striking 
coincidence of these three processes. We start from this question and elaborate on the syn-
drome as such before we dissolve the whole complex into separate relations. Specifying the 
principle that unifies socioeconomic development, cultural modernization and democratic 
regime performance has important implications. It lets us better understand which specific 
part the three subprocesses play within the whole theme; and this in turn sheds more light 
on the logical connections between these subprocesses. 
We unfold a concept based on the principle of “human choice.” This principle is implicit 
in modernization theory (Lewis 1955: 9-19), but its capacity to integrate related changes in 
socioeconomic structure, political culture and regime institutions has not yet been fully 
exploited. The following section introduces the concept of Human Development as an 
integrating framework. Anand (1993), Sen (2000) and Anand and Sen (2000) have brought 
the term Human Development to prominence. They have established the notion that 
“human choice,” or the capability of human beings to choose the live they want, should be 
used as the ultimate norm to judge the benefits and problems of social change. Norma-
tively, this is consistent with the anthropological view that “self-actualization” is the lead-
ing end in human motivation (Maslow 1970) and with the notion that the “liberation of 
life,” or the gain of options, represents a guiding principle in biological and social evolu-
tion (Birch and Cobb 1981). We agree that Human Development is a normatively prefer-
able concept. But we unfold this concept more systematically. We specify its distinct com-
ponents and their logical relationships more precisely in a way that is empirically useful to 
analyze social change across nations and cultural zones. And we use this framework to 
examine data from the World Values Surveys together with socioeconomic data from 
Vanhanen (1997) and scores for civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House. 
Subsequent sections demonstrate (1) that the syndrome of Human Development is present 
at the individual, cross-national and cross-cultural levels; (2) that this syndrome is endoge-
nously shaped by a process in which socioeconomic development and cultural moderniza-
tion lead regimes to improve their democratic performance; and (3) that elite integrity, or 
“good governance,” is a strong exogenous determinant of the Human Development syn-
drome as a whole. 
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1 Theory 
1.1 The Three Components of Human Development 
In contrast to more sophisticated conceptions of modernization, our proposition makes it 
easier to understand socioeconomic development, cultural modernization and democratic 
regime performance as distinct but interrelated facets of the same principle. We argue that 
socioeconomic development, cultural modernization, and democratic regime performance 
work together in promoting individual choice. 
Socioeconomic development expands individual choice in two ways. It gives people 
more autonomy over their resources in that it substitutes horizontal market relations for 
parochial clientelistic ties. Moreover, socioeconomic development gives people more 
physical and cognitive resources by improving basic life conditions as well as incomes, 
skills and information facilities. Socioeconomic development provides the objective means 
that enable people to pursue self-determination. This view is as old as Aristotle and has 
been continued from Marx to Lewis (1955) and Sen (2000). We conclude that socioeco-
nomic development contributes autonomy resources to individual choice. And we label the 
process which makes socioeconomic development relevant to individual choice as resource 
allocation. 
Cultural modernization is the second subprocess which is relevant to individual choice. 
Cultural modernization mobilizes human motivations to higher levels of ambitions. It leads 
people to place increasingly high priority on individual choice. Cultural modernization 
contributes liberty aspirations to individual choice. This is consistent with the notion that 
individual choice is not only a matter of one’s means but also of one’s mind (cf. Rokeach 
1960). What makes cultural modernization relevant to individual choice is aspiration 
mobilization. 
Democracy is the third element of individual choice, providing an institutional structure 
that codifies civil and political freedom. Improving a political regime’s democratic per-
formance contributes freedom opportunities to individual choice. This notion, too, goes far 
back to Mill and Dewey who saw opportunities for “individual self-development” 
(Macpherson 1977: 44-76) as an inherent value of democracy. Democratization is relevant 
to individual choice through opportunity codification. 
Autonomy resources, liberty aspirations and freedom opportunities are the three compo-
nents of Human Development. And resource allocation, aspiration mobilization and 
opportunity codification are the three subprocesses through which these components 
emerge. In the Human Development perspective, resource allocation, aspiration mobiliza-
tion and opportunity codification are the functional equivalents of socioeconomic devel-
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opment, cultural modernization and democratization, respectively. Table 1 gives a summa-
rizing picture of our conception and terminology. 
 
Table 1: The Concept of Human Development 
COMPONENTS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPONENTS’ 
CHARACTERISTICS Economic Component Ethical Component Institutional Component 
Substance of Components Autonomy Resources Liberty Aspirations Freedom Opportunities 
Underlying Processes Resource Allocation  (socioecon. development) 
Aspiration Mobilization 
(cultural modernization) 
Opportunity Codification 
(regime democratization) 
Spheres where 
components emerge 
Realm of Means 
(socioeconomic structure) 
Realm of Values 
(political culture) 
Realm of Rules 
(regime institutions) 
Causal Direction 
 
Point of Convergance Individual Choice on a Mass-Level, i.e., Human Development of Societies 
 
The three components and subprocesses of Human Development coincide in their focus on 
individual choice. Progress in any of these aspects widens the human leverage in societies, 
giving people larger resources, stronger aspirations and wider opportunities to make use of 
their individual talents. Human Development of societies means growing individual choice 
on a mass level. 
Human Development is not a teleological concept. It does not imply that its three sub-
processes necessarily proceed in a linear upwards direction. Human Development only 
implies that resource allocation, aspiration mobilization, and opportunity codification 
show a strong tendency for coincidence. This tendency can move either in a regressive or 
progressive direction. There is no iron law of linear progress but rather a probabilistic ten-
dency for coincidence to either narrow or widen the range of human choice within socie-
ties. 
The concept of Human Development goes beyond standard modernization theory in 
being both more comprehensive and more specific. Usually, theories cannot maximize 
comprehensiveness and specificness at the same time, but the concept of Human Develop-
ment does. On one hand, it is comprehensive in that it integrates major changes in socio-
economic structure, political culture, and regime institutions. On the other hand, this con-
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cept is specific because it concentrates on one theme: the expansion or recession of human 
choice. 
1.2 The Two Linkages of Human Development 
Individual choice is the common principle which integrates the three components of 
Human Development. Since choice refers to individuals, the linkages between these com-
ponents should be deduced from patterns of individual behavior and additional 
assumptions how these patterns translate from the individual to the societal level. Basic 
behavioral assumptions suggest that the Human Development syndrome is shaped by two 
linkages: (1) a resource-aspiration linkage in which aspirations adjust to given resources; 
and (2) an aspiration-opportunity linkage in which opportunities get suited to prevailing 
aspirations. We outline briefly why these are the most logical linkages. 
The Resource-Aspiration Linkage: If avoiding the psychological costs of frustration is a 
rational human behavior, then it is irrational for people to evolve aspirations for goals that 
are beyond the reach of their means or resources. When this happens, it is a rare aberration 
from a behavioral pattern that is known in social psychology as “aspiration adjustment” 
(Costa, McCrae, and Zonderman 1987; Cummins 1995; Eckersley 2000). Studies 
conducted in countries with very different cultural backgrounds, ranging from the U.S., to 
Mexico, Nigeria, and China, have found that individuals in less secure economic positions 
and with lower education, show relatively weak aspirations for political participation 
(Inkeles and Smith 1975; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979; Dalton 
1996). Effective participation is beyond these peoples’ resources. Conversely, more 
ambitious aspirations, such as those reflected in postmaterialism, have been shown to be 
most prevalent among people with a relatively secure economic status and higher education 
(Brint 1984; Scarbrough 1995). We will show that liberty aspirations, which include 
postmaterialism, also tend to be more prevalent among people with more autonomy 
resources. This reflects a basic mechanism due to which people adjust their aspirations to 
their resources. Growing autonomy resources therefore give rise to stronger liberty 
aspirations. 
The Aspiration-Opportunity Linkage: Mass aspirations that prevail within a community 
contain which opportunities are demanded by that community. Hence, aspirations put 
adjustment pressure on opportunities. On the other hand, opportunities cannot create corre-
sponding aspirations, unless the resources that support these aspirations are present. For 
example, consider India: though offering its citizens relatively wide freedom opportunities 
during 50 years of democracy, Indian society did not evolve correspondingly strong liberty 
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aspirations (see India’s location on Figure 1). Conversely, former Czechoslovakia provided 
its citizens narrow freedom opportunities during four decades of communist rule, but the 
Czechs (and to a lesser degree also the Slovaks) developed much stronger liberty aspira-
tions than most of the Indians did—in keeping with their larger autonomy resources that 
derived from a higher level of socioeconomic development (see Figure 1). This does not 
mean that freedom opportunities cannot exist without corresponding liberty aspirations. 
Actually they can, as the Indian example shows. But if so, freedom opportunities are inef-
fective (which explains why India is such an exceptional case). To be used effectively, 
freedom opportunities need corresponding liberty aspirations but cannot create them. 
Liberty aspirations, on the other hand, are inherently directed towards freedom opportuni-
ties. Hence, if adjustment pressure is at work, it works from liberty aspirations on freedom 
opportunities rather than the reverse. 
1.3 The Dynamics of the Human Development Linkages 
The resource-aspiration linkage and the aspiration-opportunity linkage are shaped in differ-
ent ways. Resource allocation and aspiration mobilization are processes that originate at 
the individual level and translate to the societal level through mass-accumulation. Thus, 
autonomy resources and liberty aspirations are connected through a co-evolutionary link. 
This makes large discrepancies between societies’ autonomy resources and liberty aspira-
tions unlikely. 
By contrast, freedom opportunities do not evolve from the individual level. Freedom 
opportunities are codified at the societal level. Elites can codify or nullify freedom oppor-
tunities almost over night, as it happens when autocracies are turned into democracies, or 
the reverse. Hence, there is no such co-evolutionary link between aspiration mobilization 
and opportunity codification. Large discrepancies between societies’ liberty aspirations 
and freedom opportunities can therefore occur. Publics may develop strong liberty aspira-
tions, but authoritarian elites can suppress them. 
In the long run, however, rising liberty aspirations make “aspiration suppression” 
increasingly costly, especially when these aspirations are nourished by corresponding 
autonomy resources. Then it is more likely that liberty aspirations overcome—under addi-
tional circumstances1—the mobilization hurdles, which are typical of authoritarian 
regimes, giving way to powerful movements for democracy. Conversely, “aspiration sup-
                                                 
 1 It is no room here to describe these ‘additional circumstances,’ but see Foweraker and Landman (1997: 
chapter 8). 
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pression” is less costly, if liberty aspirations are too weak to mobilize large segments of 
the population. This may explain why, in 1989, Chinese elites calculated relatively low 
risks of crushing the encapsulated and largely student-based pro-democracy demonstrations 
on T’iananmen square, while East German as well as Czech elites calculated the risks of 
using troops against their country’s massive, nation-wide demonstrations as too high. 
We conclude that autonomy resources and liberty aspirations tend to coincide at any 
given point in time, while liberty aspirations and freedom opportunities may show larger 
discrepancies in a cross-sectional snapshot. Nevertheless, even liberty aspirations and 
freedom opportunities should tend to coincide in the long run. This coincidence should 
become increasingly evident as we extend our perspective over time. 
2 Methodology: The Logics of Aggregation and Mass-Accumulation 
The theory of Human Development uses behavioral assumptions in its reasoning why link-
ages at the societal level exist. Thus, it should be demonstrated that these assumptions hold 
at both the individual and societal levels. Moreover, if this is a general theory, it must hold 
across societies of different cultural zones. We test these requirements in a multi-level 
design that covers the individual, cross-national and cross-cultural levels. We analyze the 
extent to which the linkages of Human Development are present at each level of analysis. 
The correlations which reflect the Human Development syndrome probably vary at dif-
ferent levels of analysis. The strength of correlations usually increases, sometimes dramati-
cally, as one moves to higher levels of aggregation. For example, Robinson (1950) found 
that the correlation between illiteracy and being a black American was .95 at the regional 
level but shrunk to .21 when disaggregated to the individual level. Scholars have some-
times used this example to argue that aggregate level correlations are “spurious” if they 
greatly exceed the individual level correlation (cf. Przeworski and Teune 1970: 72). 
However, what Robinson actually claimed, and proved mathematically, is that one can-
not assume that an individual level correlation must have similar strength and direction to 
the aggregate level correlation. Scholars who make that assumption without testing it sta-
tistically fall victim to an “ecological fallacy.” But whether an aggregate level correlation is 
an artifact, or reflects a real relationship, is another question that is unaffected by the prob-
lem of cross-level variances. 
There are basically two types of cross-level variances. One is that an effect operates in 
opposite directions at different levels of analysis. This is seen when a correlation changes 
its sign when considered at the aggregate level and the individual level. Though even this 
case does not invalidate the aggregate level correlation, it eliminates the applicability of a 
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general theory: mechanisms that work in opposite directions cannot be explained by the 
same theory. The second possibility is that a correlation does not change its sign but only 
its magnitude with different levels of analysis. Indeed, it is very usual that correlations in-
crease with higher levels of aggregation. This, however, has little relevance to the applica-
bility of a general theory. We briefly explain why. 
A correlation between two variables must be stronger at the aggregate level, if the 
underlying process sweeps rather uniformly through entire populations but to degrees that 
vary largely between populations. Processes of this kind shift the mean-level of a popula-
tion variable in a way that may have relatively little impact on the within-population vari-
ance. But if such mean-level shifts occur to different degrees between populations, they 
increase the between-population variance. For instance, 200 years ago the income ratio of 
the richest to the poorest nations was approximately 5:1. But uneven economic growth has 
dramatically risen this ratio up to 400:1, while within nations, regional income differences 
rarely exceed ratios of 5:1 (Landes 1998: xx). Hence, economic growth, or resource allo-
cation in general, sweeps relatively uniformly through nations, while it creates much 
greater differences between them. As a consequence, any effect connected to resource allo-
cation, such as aspiration mobilization, must be more pronounced between than within 
nations.  
Social change creates larger variances and covariances between than within nations. This 
reflects that nations have some homogenizing effect on the citizens that are socialized 
within them. Population variables show intra-national homogeneity to the degree that indi-
viduals are clustered around the national mean. If this is so for a pair of related variables x 
and y, large parts of a population are bound within a range where x may have no effect on 
y, which necessarily results in a weak or insignificant individual level correlation within 
nations.2 
The second reason why aggregate level correlations tend to be stronger than those at the 
individual level is that survey data contain a large component of measurement error: many 
respondents give erratic answers that reflect “non-attitudes,” producing much random noise 
in representative survey data (Converse 1970). As Yule and Kendall (1950) and Blalock 
(1961) pointed out, the variation of a variable consists of a systematic and a random ele-
ment. Hence, the correlation between two variables x and y, too, consists of a systematic 
term and a random term which diminishes the systematic correlation (“attenuation effect”). 
But when x and y are averaged across social units, the random elements counterweigh each 
other: negative and positive deviations from the mean, which are random, cancel each other 
                                                 
 2 If the variance/covariance of two variables is larger between than within nations, the correlation is 
stronger and more significant at the pooled individual level across nations than at the individual level 
within nations. An example is mentioned in fn. 6. 
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out (Page and Shapiro 1993: 40). Following the law of large numbers, this “reduction of 
error” becomes more pronounced as the number of individuals being aggregated rises. 
Consequently, the random term becomes smaller, and the systematic correlation larger, 
with higher levels of aggregation. When this is the case, aggregation does not obscure but 
reveals the “real” correlation. 
It is at the heart of aggregation—and of mass accumulation as a “real” process—that 
irregularities of millions of individuals are bound within the regularities of the social units 
in which these individuals are socialized (Converse 1970, Page and Shapiro 1993: 39-41). 
The creation of regularity is the very principle of the socialization process. Regular rela-
tionships therefore become more visible when whole units of socialization are compared. 
A deeper insight into the problem can be provided by multi-level regression analysis, 
which indicates level-specific relations when intercepts or slopes vary for the level of 
analysis. Our analyses will test whether the Human Development linkages show varying 
intercepts or slopes at the individual, cross-national and cross-cultural levels. 
3 Analyses 
3.1 Data Sources and Variables 
In order to test the theory of Human Development we need representative survey data, 
which measure liberty aspirations for as many countries as possible. We will use the larg-
est available database, the World Values Surveys (WVS), which cover 63 countries repre-
senting almost 80 per cent of the world’s population. 
Table 2 gives an overview of how we measured the components of Human Development 
at different levels (description of scale construction and data sources are in the footnotes of 
this table). The resource-component is measured by individuals’ financial income (material 
resources), education attainment level (cognitive resources), and the interaction of both 
(mat-cog resources). Since incomes are measured in national currency deciles and since 
education levels are not equivalent between nations, it makes no sense to use these vari-
ables in cross-national comparisons. We use them only for analyses at the individual level 
within nations. At the aggregate level, we measure resources by a composite index (auton-
omy resources) which is taken from Vanhanen (1997) and which combines measures for 
the nations’ distribution of material resources, cognitive resources, and social diversifica-
tion. We use Vanhanen’s most recent measure of this index, which captures the early 
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1990s.3 This measure shows such a strong intertemporal correlation that it reflects long-
term differences in nations’ resource allocation.4 
 
Table 2: Variables Measuring Human Development 
COMPONENTS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
LEVELS 
OF ANALYSIS Resources Aspirations Opportunities 
Individual Level – Material Resources1 
– Cognitive Resources2 
– Mat-Cog Resources3 
– Liberty Aspirations5 
 
– Support for Democracy6 
Aggregate Levels – Autonomy Resources4 – Liberty Aspirations5 – Support for Democracy6 
– Freedom Opportunities7 
1 Individual financial income in national currency deciles from V227 WVS. 
2 Education level attained on 10-categorical ordinal scale from V217 WVS. 
3 Interaction (product score) of income (v227) and education (V217) from WVS. 
4 Vanhanen-index of economic resources. Subindex of material resource distribution generated from share of family 
farms in the agricultural sector (weighted for the agricultural sector’s share in GDP) and the deconcentration of non-
agricultural resources (measured by 100 minus the share in GDP generated by the state, foreign enterprises and large 
national trusts). Subindex of cognitive resource distribution is measured by the number of students per 100,000 
inhabitants and the literacy rate. Subindex of occupational diversification produced from the proportion of the 
urban population and the percentage of the non-agricultural work force. All three subindices multiplied and 
standardized to 100 as the maximum. For a detailed description of scale construction and data sources, see Vanhanen 
(1997: 42-63). 
5 Factor scores for the modern libertarian value dimension which summarizes postmaterialism, tolerance toward 
homosexuals, signing petitions, generalized trust, and life satisfaction (all from WVS; see Table 4 for a description).  
6 Index developed by Klingemann (1999) from WVS. 4-point scale (1: very bad, 2: fairly bad, 3: fairly good, 4: very 
good) for “Having a democratic system” (V157) and 4-point scale (1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: agree, 4: 
strongly agree) for “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (V163) added 
to a 7-point index of prodemocratic orientation. Similarly, 4-point scales for “Having a strong leader” (V154) and 
“Having the army rule” (V156) added to a 7-point index of antidemocratic orientation. Then the index of anti-
democratic orientation is subtracted from that for the prodemocratic orientation to create the scale of support of 
democracy ranging from -7 to +7. 
7 Multiplied scores for civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House (ed.), Freedom in the World. Data can 
be downloaded from the web page: “http:\\www.freedomhouse.org.” 
 
The aspiration-component of Human Development is measured by a scale of factor scores 
summarizing several indicators of liberty aspirations. Most of these measures are taken 
from the 1990-WVS (N = 42). Where these measures were not available, those from the 
                                                 
 3 Vanhanen’s measure does not only capture levels but also distributions of resources. The distributional 
perspective is inherent in democratic theory from Aristotle to Dahl (1973: chapter 4). Thus, it is no 
surprise that Vanhanen’s measure is closer correlated with our measures of liberty aspirations (r = .88) 
and freedom opportunities (.84) than is per capita GDP (.80 and .82, respectively). Vanhanen’s measure 
outperforms also the Human Development Index (.70, .78) which captures basic quality of life issues, 
like health, education and income. This is also not surprising, since societies are at variance in these 
issues when they move from an income level of ca. 1,000 to about 5,000 US-$ per capita. Below and 
above that range, there is little variance in quality of life issues (Hughes 1999: 98). 
 4 The correlation with the same measure from 1988 is r = .96 (N = 145) and r = .90 (N = 117) for 1970-79. 
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1995-98-WVS were used (N = 21). Much like autonomy resources, liberty aspirations 
reflect long-term differences between nations, which allows us to substitute the 1995-98 
measures for the 1990-measures when the latter are missing.5 
The opportunity-component of Human Development (freedom opportunities) is meas-
ured by the product of the scores for “civil liberties” and “political rights” published annu-
ally by Freedom House. To correct short-term fluctuations and measurement errors, we 
averaged these scores over the period 1989-2000. Freedom opportunities are codified at the 
societal level and have therefore no direct equivalent at the individual level. But something 
related to freedom opportunities at the individual level is peoples’ support for democracy: 
the more individuals support democracy and the more intensively they do, the stronger is 
the public pressure to sustain or establish freedom opportunities. Increasing support for 
democracy should be the mechanism through which the effect of liberty aspirations on 
freedom opportunities operates. To capture this mechanism we use a scale of support for 
democracy developed by Klingemann (1999). This continuous scale is constructed in a way 
that avoids capturing only lip service to democracy. 
Table 3 displays the results of the factor analyses that generate scores indicating the 
strength of liberty aspirations. Using indicators analyzed by Inglehart and Baker (2000), 
we were searching for a relatively parsimonious solution that is robust at both the individ-
ual and the cross-national level; that provides a maximum “nomological validity” in pre-
dicting freedom opportunities; and that produces an intuitively understandable dimensional 
structure, in keeping with prevailing theories of value change. 
The solution we found is one in which postmaterialist preferences for self-expression, 
interpersonal tolerance, spontaneous engagement, generalized trust and life satisfaction all 
tap the dimension of modern ‘libertarian’ orientations—as opposed to traditional ‘com-
munitarian’ orientations which comprise religiousness, association membership and an 
emphasis on the familial community. Modern ‘libertarian’ orientations are “modern” 
because they increase with socioeconomic modernization.6 And they are “libertarian” 
because they value the autonomy of the individual more highly than the authority of the 
community. Traditional ‘communitarian’ orientations are “traditional” in that they prevail 
in economically less advanced societies. And they are “communitarian” in that they 
emphasize community authority more strongly than individual autonomy. Not surprisingly, 
modern ‘libertarian’ and traditional ‘communitarian’ orientations are not perfectly inde-
pendent from each other: religiousness is negatively associated with modern ‘libertarian’ 
orientations, as are spontaneous engagement and generalized trust with traditional ‘com-
munitarian’ orientations. This implies that the rise of modern ‘libertarian’ orientations is 
                                                 
 5 For 28 cases both measures are available. The intertemporal correlation amounts to r = .94. 
 6 This is shown by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and can be seen in Figure 1 here. 
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linked with a decline in traditional ‘communitarian’ orientations, which is logical since 
individual autonomy and community authority cannot be maximized at the same time. We 
measure liberty aspirations using factor scores summarizing the dimension of modern ‘lib-
ertarian’ orientations.7 
3.2 Data Imputation 
In addition to the empirical data that we have, we impute missing data on liberty aspira-
tions for another 17 nations. Data imputation is a strongly recommended procedure when 
missing data are not random (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). The missing data clearly 
are not random in the WVS, which over-represent European and American countries, and 
under-represent Islamic and Sub-Saharan ones—although we have empirical data for 
Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa from the Sub-Saharan region; and for Azerbaijan, Bang-
ladesh, Turkey, and Pakistan from the Islamic zone. These data provide a basis for imput-
ing missing data on liberty aspirations for other countries in these regions. 
The conditions for data imputation are favorable in this case, because the relationships in 
which we are interested show a strong “predictive validity” (Zeller and Carmines 1980). If 
we know the religious makeup of each society and its level of autonomy resources, we can 
explain fully 90 percent of the cross-national variance in the strength of liberty aspira-
tions.8 The fact that liberty aspirations can be predicted with a very minor error is impor-
tant. It implies that data imputation does not influence the effect of liberty aspirations on 
freedom opportunities. The residuals that we obtain by predicting liberty aspirations from 
autonomy resources are clearly within the range where liberty aspirations have no effect 
on freedom opportunities.9 
                                                 
 7 Factor solutions normally are more strongly structured on the cross-national level than on the pooled 
individual level because individual level measurement error gets averaged out through aggregation. 
Postmaterialism, spontaneous engagement and interpersonal tolerance load on the modern ‘libertarian’ 
dimension in 76 of 92 national surveys (83%), but generalized trust and life satisfaction are less likely to 
do so. Nevertheless, on the pooled individual level all of these attitudes are clearly linked with this 
dimension. This reflects that important features of a dimension may manifest themselves only when the 
between-nation variation is included—which is the case when one works with pooled individual data. 
 8 The equation is: LIBERTY ASPIRATIONS = -1.00 + .04*AUTONOMY RESOURCES + .007*PROTESTANTS - 
.009*ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS – .007*MUSLIMS – .06*CONFUCIANS + .005*NONRELIGIOUS PEOPLE + 
.25*EX-BRITISH. This equation results in an .90 adjusted R squared for 57 cases. Proportion of Buddhists, 
Catholics, Hindus and Animists and dummy for postcommunism excluded by backward deletion. 
Proportions of religious groups are taken from the country reports in Britannica Book of the Year 2000. 
 9  The range corresponds to the distance between Moldova and Mexico in Figure 2, a distance of 1.3 points 
on the -2 to +2.3 factor scale for liberty aspirations. The error in predicting liberty aspirations is clearly 
within this range: the largest residual we found is .49 in case of Turkey. This is only one third of the 1.3 
points that must be exceeded, if prediction error should distort the effect of liberty aspirations on 
freedom opportunities. 
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Table 3: The Value-Dimension of Liberty Aspirations 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
Individual Level 
(pooled across nations) 
National Level 
VARIABLES 
Modern 
‘Libertarian’ 
Orientations 
Traditional 
‘Communitarian’ 
Orientations 
Modern 
‘Libertarian’ 
Orientations 
Traditional 
‘Communitarian’ 
Orientations 
Postmaterialism1 .64  .90  
Interpersonal Tolerance2 .65  .88 .15 
Spontaneous Engagement3 .64  .83 -.17 
Generalized Trust4 .42  .73 -.20 
Life Satisfaction5 .48 .39 .84 .32 
Religiousness6 -.28 .74 -.35 .83 
Association Membership7 .25 .68 .11 .75 
Familial Community8  .30  .73 
Explained variance 22% 16% 45% 25% 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-Measure .65 .73 
N 152,768 57 
Notes: Entries are factor loadings. Explorative principal components analysis (extraction of factors with Eigenvalues 
above 1 advised), no rotation. Factor loadings below .10 suppressed. 
1 Respondents’ priorities for “giving people more say in important government decisions,” “protecting freedom of 
speech,” (V106-107) and “seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities” (V104-105) added to a six-point index, assigning 2 points for first priority, 1 point for second priority 
and 0 points for no priority on each of these items. 
2 “Not mentioned” for “disliked neighbors” dichotomized as 1 against 0; scores added for neighbors with AIDS (V58) 
and homosexual neighbors (V60). 
3 “Already done” for “signing petitions” (V118) coded “1” and dichotomized against “0.” 
4 Respondents believing “most people can be trusted” (V27) dichotomized as “1” against “0.” 
5 10-point rating scale for life satisfaction from WVS (V65). 
6 “How important is God in your life?” (V190). 10-point scale (1: not at all, 10: very important). 
7 “Active membership” dichotomized as “1” against “0” and added for “Religious Organizations” (V28) and 
“Charitable Organizations” (V35). 
8 “Importance of family” (V4), “very important” dichotomized as “1” against “0.” 
 
Liberty aspirations are so strongly determined by autonomy resources and religious tra-
dition that we could make reasonable predictions for any country in the world. But we do 
not intend to present a simulation study. We want to present an empirical study that is pri-
marily based on real data, supplemented by some predictions for selected countries from 
underrepresented regions. We selected 17 countries that will be covered by the next wave 
of the WVS: Luxemburg, Greece, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, Zim-
babwe, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador. This 
offers a chance to test the validity of our analyses in the near future. 
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For methodological reasons, one should use data imputation if missing data are not ran-
dom and if there are strong empirical relations in the real data from which reasonable pre-
dictions can be derived. Both preconditions are satisfied in case of the WVS: countries 
from certain cultural zones are underrepresented; and there is an extraordinarily strong 
relationship between autonomy resources and liberty aspirations. Nonetheless, we remain 
cautious in imputing missing data for liberty aspirations. Cases with imputed data repre-
sent only one fifth of our sample, and we down-weight these cases by 20 per cent whenever 
used in subsequent analyses (which is double the prediction error of 10%). We have 
checked whether the inclusion of imputed data does any change to our statistical results. 
We have found that it does not. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these data provides a more 
complete picture of the world. So we report the results with imputed data included—except 
where the effect of autonomy resources on liberty aspirations is estimated. To avoid tau-
tological results, these estimations do not include imputed cases (inclusion/exclusion of 
imputed cases is noted in the tables). 
3.3 Operationalizing Cultural Zones 
Weber (1958), Eisenstadt (1986), Huntington (1996) and many others emphasized that 
nations cluster into larger units labeled “country families,” “cultural zones,” or “civiliza-
tions.” Nations belonging to a common cultural zone tend to share similar worldviews, 
institutional traditions and patterns of economic subsistence. Three variables determine 
these cultural zones: religion, region, and imperial legacy. 
Since Weber, it has been widely accepted that societies’ religious traditions are prime 
carriers of popular belief systems. Such belief systems influence which economic activities 
are preferred and which political institutions are supported by the population. Regional 
proximity is a second factor. It facilitates the diffusion of ideologies, economic habits and 
institutions across nations (Kopstein and Reilly 2000). A third relevant factor is imperial 
legacy. There is evidence that a British colonial heritage is conducive to libertarian values 
and institutions, while communist rule contributed to an egalitarian and secular worldview 
(cf. Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993). 
Table 4 shows how we grouped the WVS-nations to cultural zones (nations with 
imputed data for liberty aspirations appear in bold letters). The first criterion is religious 
tradition, which we differentiated in a way that produces at least 8 cases in each category. 
Thus, we have 20 countries with a historically Protestant tradition or with Protestants as the 
largest religious group among their populations; 29 Catholic countries; 10 Christian Ortho-
dox countries; 11 Islamic countries; and a residual category of 8 “Asian” countries, most of 
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Table 4: The Location of the WVS-Nations within Cultural Zones 
RELIGION 
REGION Protestant Catholic Orthodox Islamic ‘Asian’ 
Western 
Europe 
Germany 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
 
Great Britain 
Austria 
Switzerland 
France 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
 
  
Ex-British 
Overseas 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Canada 
USA 
    
Eastern 
Europe 
Estonia 
Latvia 
 
Lithuania 
 
Czech Rep. 
Hungary 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Croatia 
Slovenia 
 
 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Belarus 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Macedonia 
Yugoslavia 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
 
 
Bosnia-Herz. 
 
Albania 
 
 
Middle East    Iran 
Turkey 
Egypt 
Jordan 
 
South Asia    Bangladesh 
Pakistan 
Indonesia 
India 
Sri Lanka 
 
Far East     Japan 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Taiwan 
China 
Vietnam 
Sub-Saharan Ghana 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
Cameroon  Nigeria  
Latin America  Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Peru 
Philippines 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican R. 
El Salvador 
Mexico 
   
SUB-SAHARAN 
CATHOLIC 
LATIN AMERICA 
‘ASIAN’ 
Group 
ISLAMIC 
Group 
CATHOLIC 
EASTERN EUROPE 
PROTESTANT 
WESTERN WORLD 
ORTHODOX 
EASTERN EUROPE 
CATHOLIC 
WESTERN EUROPE 
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them representing a distinctive religious or ethical tradition (India: Hinduism; Japan: 
Shintoism; China, Taiwan and Vietnam: Confucianism; South Korea: Buddhism; Sri 
Lanka, Thailand: Hinayana Buddhism). 
These five religious groups were subdivided for region, if such division produced at least 
8 cases in each category. Thus, the Islamic and the ‘Asian’ group were not divided. More-
over, Estonia and Latvia, though having a Protestant tradition, were grouped with the 
Catholic Eastern European countries, with which they share the tradition of “Western 
Christianity” as opposed to Orthodox Eastern Christendom (Huntington 1996: 159). 
Finally, the Sub-Saharan countries have not been divided on the basis of religions, since 
the Christian and Islamic imprints that prevail in contemporary Africa have only in the 
colonial era been superimposed on indigenous animist traditions. The animist tradition and 
regional proximity justify classifying the Sub-Saharan countries as a group of their own. 
These cultural zones include some important aspects of nations’ imperial legacy. The 
division between Western and Eastern Europe does not follow a merely regional criterion 
but reflects the differentiation between postcommunist and non-postcommunist Europe. 
Similarly, Canada, the U.S., Australia and New Zealand are viewed as one cultural zone 
under the label “Ex-British Overseas,” though geographically they are scattered around the 
world. This reflects their common heritage as English-speaking former British colonies of 
“white” settlers, many of whom have been religious dissidents. 
This classification may seem crude, especially in view of the heterogeneous ‘Asian’ 
group. Yet, these 8 cultural zones capture 82%, 83% and 75% of the variance in autonomy 
resources, liberty aspirations and freedom opportunities across 80 nations. Thus, even this 
crude classification captures relatively homogeneous zones.10 
In addition to this continental differentiation of cultural zones, we use a more fine-tuned 
classification based on 23 sub-continental regions, such as Scandinavia, the Baltics, Trans-
caucasia, Mediterranean Europe, the Caribbean and so forth (see Appendix for this classifi-
cation). The sub-continental classification captures 91%, 88%, and 85% of the cross-
national variance in autonomy resources, liberty aspirations and freedom opportunities. 
Though this classification is almost three times as differentiated as the continental one 
(having 23 instead of 8 categories), it explains only 5 to 9 per cent more of the cross-
national variance. This finding confirms the adequacy of the cultural zones in Table 4. 
                                                 
10  We tested the robustness of these cultural zones by a discriminant analysis, using continuous variables 
for the proportions of Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, 
Confucianists, Shintoists, Animists and non-religious people; continuous variables for geographical 
location in the North-South and the East-West dimension (geographical longitude and latitude of the 
countries’ capitals); as well as dummies for postcommunism and former British colonial status. This 
discriminant analysis did not arrange the countries of the ‘Asian’ group into different cultural zones. 
Although the countries of the ‘Asian’ group are heterogeneous, they are more similar to each other than 
to any other group. 
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3.4 The Human Development Linkages in the Multi-Level Perspective 
Table 5 demonstrates that the linkages of Human Development are present at the individual 
level. In 96 per cent of the surveys—including such diverse countries as China, Russia, 
Japan, Turkey, Argentina or Sweden—people with more material and cognitive resources 
show significantly stronger liberty aspirations. Similarly, people with stronger liberty aspi-
rations show significantly stronger support for democracy in 88 per cent of the surveys. 
There is considerable cross-national variation in the magnitude of these correlations but 
less so in their direction and significance. Considering the measurement error that is usu-
ally present at the individual level, the correlations are reasonably strong, virtually always 
in the expected direction and significant in 88 to 98 per cent of the surveys. 
Table 6 shows with impressive clarity that the Human Development linkages do not sub-
stantially vary in either their intercepts or slopes for different levels of analysis. Whether at 
the individual-, national, sub-continental or continental level, intercepts and slopes remain 
almost constant. Figures 1 and 2 give an intuitively clearer picture of this finding. The 
upper plots show the linkages across nations, the lower plots across sub-continental and 
continental zones. In every case, the regression equations are almost identical. 
A more integrated way to express these findings is to specify multi-level models in 
which we estimate overall intercepts and slopes that are constant across contextual units, 
together with the intercept- and slope-variation for contextual units. In this way we 
formulate the relation between liberty aspirations and support for democracy by a three-
level model. The levels of variation are indicated with suffix “i” for the individual level, 
suffix “j” for the national level and suffix “k” for the cross-cultural level. The “random 
slopes and intercepts model” is written as follows: 
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACYijk = ß0jk + ß1jk*LIBERTY ASPIRATIONSijk + eijk 
We can express the composition of intercept and slope as follows: 
Intercept: ß0jk = ß0 + v0k + u0jk  
Slope: ß1jk = ß1 + v1k + u1jk 
Intercept and slope are each composed of a fixed part, which is constant across different 
contexts (ß0, ß1) and two variable parts, which differ for nations (u0jk, u1jk) and for conti-
nental zones (v0k, v1k). In addition, there is an error term for individuals’ remaining varia-
tion in support for democracy (eijk). This random variation can neither be attributed to the 
overall effects of liberty aspirations (ß0, ß1) nor to their contextual variation (v0k, u0jk, v1k, 
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u1jk). Estimating this model for 56,613 individuals within 53 nations within 8 continental 
zones provides the results in Table 7.11 
 
Table 5: The Linkages of Human Development at the Individual Level (Pearson’s R’s) 
Type of Link Correlated 
Variables 
Pooled 
Correlation 
(N) 
Mean Correlation 
across National 
Surveys 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Mean 
Correlation 
Number of 
Surveys with 
Significant 
Correlation and 
Expected Sign 
Material 
Resources 
with 
Liberty 
Aspirations 
.19*** 
(83,155) 
.20 
 
.12 74 of 771 
(96%) 
Cognitive 
Resources 
with 
Liberty 
Aspirations 
.12*** 
(71,351) 
.30 .12 61 of 622 
(99%) 
RESOURCE-
ASPIRATION 
Linkage 
Mat-Cog 
Resources 
with 
Liberty 
Aspirations 
.20*** 
(56,370) 
.29 .09 53 of 543 
(99%) 
ASPIRATION-
OPPORTUNITY 
Linkage 
Liberty 
Aspirations 
with 
Support of 
Democracy 
.28*** 
(57,978) 
.19 .11 46 of 524 
(88%) 
Significance Levels: * p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
In the following, Roman figures indicate the respective wave of the WVS: I (1981), II (1990-91), III (1995-98). 
1 Following surveys show significant correlations with expected sign: France II; Great Britain II; Germany (West) II, 
III; Italy II; Netherlands II; Denmark II; Belgium II; Spain II, III; Ireland II; Northern Ireland II; USA II; Canada II; 
Japan II; Mexico II; Hungary II; Australia III; Norway II, III; Sweden II, III; Tambov III; Argentina II, III; Finland II, 
III; Switzerland III; Puerto Rico III; Brazil II, III; Nigeria III; Chile II, III; Belarus II, III; India II, III; Germany 
(East) II, III; Slovenia II; Bulgaria II; Romania III; Taiwan III; Portugal III; Austria II; Turkey II, III; Moscow II; 
Lithuania III; Latvia II, III; Estonia III; Ukraine III; Russia II, III; Peru III; Venezuela III; Uruguay III; Moldova III; 
Georgia III; Armenia III; Azerbaijan III; Dominican Republic III; Bangladesh III; Basque III; Andalusia III; Galicia 
III; Valencia III; Serbia III; Montenegro III; Croatia III; Slovakia III; Bosnia III. Following surveys show either 
insignificant or negative correlations: Mexico III; South Africa III; Hungary III; Nigeria II; Ghana III. 
2 Philippines III show an insignificant negative correlation. 
3 Ghana III shows an insignificant .09 correlation. 
4 Mexico III, India III, Venezuela III, Philippines III, Azerbaijan III, Bangladesh III show insignificant or negative 
correlations. 
 
 
                                                 
11  We used the MLWin-software developed by Goldstein et. al. (1998). This program runs an iterative 
generalized least squares procedure. 
  
Table 6: The Linkages of Human Development at Different Levels (Regression Analy
RESOURCE-ASPIRATION LINKAGE ASPIRATIO
Autonomy Resources (independent 
variable) 
Liberty Aspirations (dependent variable) 
Liberty Aspirations (independent v
Freedom Opportunities 1985-
(dependent var.) 
LEVELS 
Intercept 
(Standard 
Error) 
Slope 
(Standard 
Error)  
Pearson’s 
R 
N Intercept 
(Standard 
Error) 
Slope 
(Standard 
Error) 
Pearson’s 
R 
Individual        
National -1.23*** 
(.08) 
.049*** 
(.003) 
.89 63a 361.45*** 
(11.50) 
164.35*** 
(11.85) 
.84 
Sub-
Continental 
-1.32*** 
(.11) 
.053*** 
(.004) 
.93 23 353.72*** 
(15.37) 
176.95*** 
(15.59) 
.92 
Continental  -1.27** 
(.20) 
.052** 
(.008) 
.94 8 359.99*** 
(24.11) 
180.17** 
(27.69) 
.94 
a Cases with “imputed data” for liberty aspirations excluded. 
b Cases with “imputed data” for liberty aspirations weighted by .80. 
Using the DFFITs statistic, no unusual cases have been identified. 
Significance Levels: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 ses) 
N-OPPORTUNITY LINKAGE 
ariable) 
99 
Liberty Aspirations (independent variable) 
Support of Democracy (dependent 
variable) 
N Intercept 
(Standard 
Error) 
Slope 
(Standard 
Error) 
Pearson’s 
R 
N 
 4.07*** 
(.01) 
.85*** 
(.01) 
.28 57,978 
80b 4.16*** 
(.15) 
1.245*** 
(.24) 
.60 52 
23 4.08*** 
(.23) 
.80** 
(.38) 
.43 21 
8 4.07*** 
(.26) 
.94* 
(.47) 
.64 8 
21 
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Figure 1: The Resource-Aspiration Linkage across Nations and Cultural Zones 
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Figure 2: The Aspiration-Opportunity Linkage across Nations and Cultural Zones 
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Table 7: Human Development in Integrated Multi-Level Models  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
MODELS 
COMPONENTS 
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACYijk 
= ß0jk+ß1jk*LIBERTY 
ASPIRATIONSijk + eijk 
LIBERTY ASPIRATIONSjk 
= ß0k +ß1k*AUTONOMY 
RESOURCESjk + ejk 
FREEDOM OPPORTUNITIESJK 
= ß0k+ß1k*LIBERTY 
ASPIRATIONSjk + ejk 
Intercept, fixed 
component 
ß0 2.66 
(.19) 
-1.25 
(.08) 
359.68 
(11.36) 
Intercept-variance 
for Cultural Zones 
v0k .46 
(.37) 
.10 
(.04) 
100.05 
(2635.76) 
Intercept-variance 
for Nations 
u0jk 1.16 
(.36) —— —— 
Slope, fixed  
component 
ß1 1.14 
(.11) 
.05 
(.003) 
164.74 
(11.63) 
Slope-variance 
for Cultural Zones 
v1k .09 
(.11) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Slope-variance 
for Nations 
u1jk .38 
(.13) —— —— 
Random Variance eijk / 
ejk 
7.10 
(.04) 
.10 
(.04) 
9741.83 
(3049.38) 
Intercept-slope 
Covariance 
 -.43 
(.10) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Symbols: Suffixes: 
ß Fixed components 0 Intercept 
v Variance for cultural zones 1 Slope 
u Variance for nations i Individual level 
e Random variation j National level 
  k Cross-cultural level (continental) 
 
These estimates indicate that liberty aspirations have a significant overall effect on support 
for democracy—an effect that is independent of contextual variation. There is no signifi-
cant variation of intercept or slope for continental units, while significant variation for 
national units does exist. In addition, the multi-level analysis displays a significant 
covariance between intercept and slope that amounts to -.43, implying an intercept-slope 
correlation of -.66.12 The negative sign indicates that slopes become smaller with growing 
intercepts. This reflects a ceiling effect, in which it becomes more difficult to obtain addi-
tional increases in support for democracy with increasing mean-levels of support for 
democracy. 
                                                 
12 The correlation is calculated dividing the intercept-slope covariance by the product between the standard 
deviations of intercept and slope: r = -.43/(√1.16*√.38) = -.43/.66 = -.66. 
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The following equations specify the resource-aspiration linkage and the aspiration-
opportunity linkage over two aggregate levels. We estimate overall intercepts and slopes 
across nations, which are then allowed to vary for continental units. These two-level mod-
els are written as follows: 
LIBERTY ASPIRATIONSjk  = ß0k + ß1k * AUTONOMY RESOURCESjk + ejk 
FREEDOM OPPORTUNITIESJK = ß0k + ß1k * LIBERTY ASPIRATIONSjk  + ejk 
According to Table 7, the overall effects of both linkages are highly significant. In addition, 
there is some intercept variance for continental zones. But there is no continental slope 
variation of any significance: if a continental slope deviates from the overall one, it is 
insignificant.13 
Cultural zones represent “real” units that have a substantial equalizing effect on the 
nations belonging to them. Since cultural homogeneity affects societies’ resources, aspira-
tions and opportunities coincidently, the Human Development syndrome is strikingly 
evident at the cross-cultural level. It is present there exactly to the degree that cultural 
zones equalize nations: cultural zones capture ca. 80 per cent of the cross-national variance 
in each component of Human Development, while the linkages between these components 
explain ca. 80 per cent of the cross-cultural variation. Thus, the concept of Human Devel-
opment is perfectly suited to describe the differences between cultures: those scoring high 
(or low) in autonomy resources also score high (or low) on liberty aspirations and freedom 
opportunities. These components tend to go together at both the cross-national level and 
even more on the cross-cultural level. 
The multi-level evidence of the Human Development syndrome leaves us with the ques-
tion of its genesis. The genetical question has two facets, one endogenous and another 
exogenous: (1) how is the syndrome of Human Development endogenously shaped, or 
which of its three components is caused by which? (2) Which exogenous factor determines 
this syndrome as a whole? 
3.5 The Endogenous Generation of Human Development 
Autonomy resources and liberty aspirations co-evolve from the individual level to the 
societal level. This co-evolutionary link narrows the time-gap in the manifestation of 
autonomy resources and liberty aspirations. And it does so in a way that makes it difficult 
                                                 
13 Slopes are insignificant among countries of the “Western Protestant World,” “Catholic Latin America,” 
the “Islamic Group,” “Catholic Eastern Europe,” and “Sub-Saharan Africa.” These cultural zones are so 
homogenous that the intra-zone variance is within the range where no effect occurs. Only the between-
zone variance exceeds this range. 
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to test for a time-sequence in the emergence of these components (even if we had sufficient 
time-series data). On the other hand, there is no such co-evolutionary link between liberty 
aspirations and freedom opportunities. In contrast to liberty aspirations, freedom opportu-
nities do not evolve from the individual level. They are codified at the societal level. 
Hence, there can be large time-gaps in the emergence of liberty aspirations and freedom 
opportunities. But time-gaps between two related variables get closed when the lagged 
variable suddenly spurts to levels of the one ahead. Such a sudden spurt actually happened 
when freedom opportunities increased massively during the “global explosion of democ-
racy” between 1985 and 1995 (Dorenspleet 2000). In this short period, an exceptionally 
large number of nations switched from autocracy to democracy and, thus, codified freedom 
opportunities that have not existed before. 
This rapid expansion of freedom opportunities provides a sharp “before” and “after” 
watershed which is perfectly suitable for a causal test: We test (1) whether liberty aspira-
tions (ca. 1990) derived from prior freedom opportunities that were present before the 
“explosion of democracy” (1980-85), or (2) whether there is a stronger effect of liberty 
aspirations on subsequent freedom opportunities that occurred thereafter (1995-00). This 
analysis will give a strong indication of which variable has causal priority. However, to 
demonstrate causality requires more than temporal priority. One must also show that the 
effect is not an artifact of a third variable, so we include autonomy resources as a control 
variable in both models. 
The results in Table 8 are clear: controlling for autonomy resources, prior levels of free-
dom opportunities have no significant effect on liberty aspirations; but conversely, liberty 
aspirations do have a significant impact on subsequent levels of freedom opportunities, 
even controlling for autonomy resources.14 This finding is perfectly in line with Human 
Development theory’s causal interpretation of the aspiration-opportunity linkage. 
The time-sequence in the manifestation of Human Development is obvious when one 
uses short-term measures of freedom opportunities. Over the long run, however, the three 
components of Human Development appear to be more closely linked—so closely, in fact, 
that it is reasonable to consider them as representing one common syndrome. Indeed, in a 
principal components analysis they are tightly clustered on one factor, with loadings of .96 
(autonomy resources), .95 (liberty aspirations) and .94 (freedom opportunities).15 This 
dimension—which we call Human Development—captures 91 per cent of the variance on 
all three variables (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .77). The fact that Human Development 
manifests itself as a closed syndrome in a long-term perspective, leaves us with another 
                                                 
14  We checked the Variance Inflation Factors in order to test whether this finding is adulterated by 
multicollinearity. It turned out that it is not. 
15  Here we operate with a long-term measure of freedom opportunities that averages scores over the years 
from 1989 to 2000. 
 27 
 
important question: which exogenous factors determine the syndrome of Human Develop-
ment as a whole, or more precisely: which leverage do collective actors have to pursue 
Human Development in any of its components? 
 
Table 8: The Causal Direction of the Aspiration-Opportunity Link 
LIBERTY ASPIRATIONS (CA. 1990) → FREEDOM OPPORTUNITIES (1995-00) 
EFFECTS 
Regression 
Coefficient B 
Standard Error Standardized 
Beta 
T-Value Significance Variance 
Inflation 
Factor 
Constant 24.24*** 3.42  7.09 .000  
Autonomy 
Resources .29* .14 .31 2.16 .034 4.65 
Liberty 
Aspirations 8.54** 2.41 .52 3.55 .001 4.65 
N = 63; adj. R sq.: .64 
FREEDOM OPPORTUNITIES (1980-85) → LIBERTY ASPIRATIONS (CA. 1990) 
EFFECTS 
Regression 
Coefficient B 
Standard Error Standardized 
B 
T-Value Significance Variance 
Inflation 
Factor 
Constant -1.24*** .080  -15.41 .000  
Autonomy 
Resources .045*** .005 .80 8.57 .000 3.16 
Freedom 
Opportunities .0009 .001 .11 1.14 .257 3.16 
N = 63; adj. R sq.: .78 
Cases with “imputed data” for liberty aspirations excluded. 
Significance Levels: *** p < .001M; ** p < .01; * p < .10 
3.6 The Leverage of Collective Actors in Promoting Human Development 
Despite the clear evidence of enduring cultural differences that we have just seen, collec-
tive actors do have a choice, and can act to encourage Human Development. Figure 3 dem-
onstrates this point, showing the impact of elite integrity on Human Development. We 
measured elite integrity using the inverse of the corruption scores published by Transpar-
ency International (calculated as 100 minus the corruption score, which ranges from 0 to 
100). As is obvious, elite integrity has a profound impact on Human Development (meas-
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ured by factor scores summarizing its three components). This finding suggests that pur-
suing policies designed to minimize elite corruption may be an effective way to promote 
Human Development in any of its components. A rational administrative and managerial 
class seems conducive to the entire syndrome of autonomy resources, liberty aspirations 
and freedom opportunities (the correlation between each of these components and elite 
integrity is about .84). 
 
Figure 3: Elite Integrity and Human Development 
 
We do not want to over-simplify. What we have is only a correlation (although a strong 
one). We lack sufficient time-series data to prove the causal direction of this correlation. 
This offers room for speculation. Elites might not have completely free choice between 
corrupt and law-abiding behavior; elite behavior may also follow societal pressure that 
derives from important aspects of Human Development. We think the most plausible inter-
pretation is that increasing liberty aspirations among citizens put pressure on elites to 
democratize institutions, to behave responsible, and to reduce corruption. Reduced corrup-
tion then leads to a more efficient allocation of public resources (a finding supported by 
Olson, Sarna and Swamy 2000). This will promote the growth of autonomy resources 
among the citizens that again gives rise to even stronger liberty aspirations. Then the cycle 
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starts anew. Alternatively, let the cycle start with elite integrity. Then this initiates the co-
evolution of resource allocation and aspiration mobilization, which in turn strengthens the 
pressure for more elite integrity. In short, elite integrity initiates its own reproduction. 
This interpretation is confirmed by a cross-sectional path analysis of our variables (only 
significant path coefficients reported): elite integrity promotes resource allocation by .82, 
which then gives rise to aspiration mobilization by .66. In turn aspiration mobilization 
favors opportunity codification by .70 from which it obtains a positive feedback by .31. 
Finally, aspiration mobilization and opportunity codification strengthen elite integrity by 
.62 and .34, respectively. Hence, elite integrity and Human Development seem to interact 
in a self-reinforcing cycle of social progress, or regress. 
Summary 
We have demonstrated that socioeconomic development, cultural modernization, and gra-
diations of democracy constitute one coherent syndrome of social change. Modernization 
theorists did not reflect this syndrome as such and thus failed to integrate its components 
into a coherent concept. The concept of Human Development, as introduced by Anand and 
Sen, has the potential of an integrated theory, but this has not been fully exploited, since 
the concept did not capture political culture so far. Thus, we described Human Develop-
ment as an integrated syndrome, arguing that the underlying theme of its three components 
is individual choice: socioeconomic development widens individual choice by giving peo-
ple more autonomy resources; cultural modernization releases liberty aspirations which 
lead people to seek for individual choice; and an improvement of a regime’s democratic 
performance extends individual choice by the codification of freedom opportunities. The 
theory of Human Development is both comprehensive and specific in that it integrates 
changes in socioeconomic structure, political culture and regime institutions into one cen-
tral theme: human choice. 
We have shown that the linkages that constitute Human Development are present at the 
individual, cross-national and cross-cultural levels, without little evidence of level-specific 
mechanisms. Since cultural zones have a strong homogenizing effect on nations, Human 
Development is particularly evident at the cross-cultural level. Indeed, cross-cultural dif-
ferences can be adequately described as differences in Human Development. We have also 
shown that the syndrome of Human Development is endogenously shaped by a causal pri-
ority of resource allocation and aspiration mobilization over opportunity codification: 
autonomy resources give rise to liberty aspirations which then determine freedom oppor-
tunities more than the reverse. On the other hand, the three components of Human Devel-
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opment represent a closed syndrome when one considers them in a long-term perspective. 
The magnitude of this syndrome is significantly linked with cultural zones, but elite integ-
rity has an even more decisive impact. The causal mechanism is probably more compli-
cated than a simple correlation can show. But this does not invalidate the conclusion that a 
reduction of elite corruption, or “good governance,” is an important contribution to Human 
Development, especially to resource allocation as its most basic subprocess. 
The theory of Human Development provides an integrated framework to analyze the 
interplay of socioeconomic development, cultural modernization and democratization, in 
relation to the leverage that collective actors have in pursuing these processes. 
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Appendix 
This list shows how we arranged countries to 23 sub-continental cultural zones: 
“German Language”: Austria, Germany, Switzerland; “Scandinavia”: Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden; “Benelux”: Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands; 
“Mediterranean”: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece; “Australia/New Zealand”; “North 
America”: Canada, U.S.A.; “Central Europe”: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia; “Post-Yugoslav WC” (Western Christian): Croatia, Slovenia; “Post-Yugoslav 
NWC” (Non-Western Christian): Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia; “Balkans NPY” (Non 
Post-Yugoslav): Bulgaria, Romania, Albania; “Post-Soviet Slavic”: Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia, Ukraine; “Baltics”: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; “Trans-Caucasus”: Armenia, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan; “Middle East”: Iran, Turkey; “Arab”: Egypt, Jordan; “South Asian 
Islamic”: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia; “South Asian NI” (Non-Islamic): India, Sri 
Lanka; “Far Eastern Capitalism”: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand; “Far Eastern 
Communism”: China, Vietnam; “Sub-Saharan”: Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Nigeria; “South America”: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, 
Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela; “Caribbean”: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic; 
“Central America”: El Salvador, Mexico. 
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